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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ex-
cludes from gross income "the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or
sickness."' By enacting this provision, Congress has recognized a
1. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976). This provision states in full:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions
allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable
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distinction between personal and nonpersonal injuries and has cho-
sen not to tax damages that a taxpayer receives as the result of
personal injuries he suffers.2 The dispositive issue courts address in
cases concerning taxation of damages is whether the damages re-
sulted from personal or nonpersonal injuries.3 Neither the Code
nor the Treasury Regulations, however, define "personal injury."
4
Courts have determined that section 104(a)(2) personal injuries in-
clude both physical and nonphysical injuries. 5 Even though courts
and the Internal Revenue Service generally interpret the term
"personal injury" strictly,6 they have held that defamatory state-
ments which injure "personal" reputation are within the scope of
section 104(a) (2).7
year, gross income does not include-
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account
of personal injuries or sickness.
Id.
The Code states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . . .gross income means all
income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61(a) (1976). Section 104(a)(2) is one of the
provisions of the Code that "otherwise" provides.
2. Congress first established this distinction in the personal injury award exclusion of
the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (current version at
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976)). See infra text accompanying note 21 (setting out provision). The
rationale that courts and commentators generally proffer for excluding personal injury dam-
ages from gross income is "that the taxation of recoveries carved from pain and suffering is
offensive, and the victim is more to be pitied rather than taxed." Harnett, Torts and Taxes,
27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 614, 627 (1952). Commentators believe that courts base that rationale in
emotion rather than logic. See, e.g., Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax
Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 701, 706 (1977).
Taxing nonpersonal injury damages, however, depends on whether the recovery is for
loss of capital or for lost profits or earnings. Id. at 702-03. Recovery of lost capital is taxable
only to the extent that the amount the taxpayers receive exceeds the basis in the capital
that the defendant's actions damage or destroy. See, e.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). Recovery for lost
profits or earnings, however, is fully taxable if the injury is non personal. Id. at 113.
3. See Fouts, Payments Received in Settlement of Litigation and Claims, 25 INST. ON
FED. TAX'N 555, 561 (1967).
4. The Treasury Regulations that the United States Treasury Department promul-
gated under the auspices of the Internal Revenue Code add to the statutory language only
that "[tihe term 'damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' means an amount re-
ceived. . . through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights,
or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution." Tress. Reg. §
1.104-1(c) (1956).
5. See infra note 22.
6. The rationale behind this strict interpretation is that compensatory personal injury
awards are excluded completely from gross income. Comment, Income Tax Effects on Per-
sonal Injury Recoveries, 30 LA. L. REv. 672, 674 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927); Sol. Op. 132, 1-1
C.B. 92 (1922); see also infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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Courts have had difficulty differentiating between statements
that injure business reputation and statements which injure per-
sonal reputation such that the injured party suffers economic harm
like lost profits or earnings. In general, courts have held that recov-
ery for damage to business reputation is not personal and, there-
fore, does not fall within the exclusion that section 104(a)(2) of-
fers.8 Courts have been uncertain about the way to treat awards for
economic injury resulting from personal defamation.' In the recent
decisions of Glynn v. Commissioner,0 Roemer v. Commissioner,"
and Church v. Commissioner,12 the United States Tax Court ap-
proached this issue by classifying the awards according to the ef-
fects of the injuries that the defamatory attacks caused,13 rather
than by the personal or nonpersonal nature of the attacks them-
selves.14 As a result, if a statement caused economic injury to the
taxpayer, the court taxed the award for that economic injury, de-
spite any possible noneconomic aspects of the injurious state-
ment.1 5 In a recent decision, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in
Roemer16 and held that the crucial issue in defamation damages
cases is the personal or nonpersonal nature of the attack, not the
effects of the injury.1
7
This Recent Development advocates that courts adopt the
Ninth Circuit's Roemer approach to determine the nature of dam-
ages for injury to reputation by focusing on the attack rather than
8. See, e.g., Agar v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116, 119 (1960), afl'd, 290 F.2d
283 (1961); see also infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
9. One commentator stated that the distinction between damages to personal as op-
posed to business reputation is the most ambiguous limit on the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. See
Lorentzen, Tax Aspects of Litigation Settlement, 17 TSm.L, May 1981, at 36, 36.
10. 76 T.C. 116 (1981), afl'd mem., 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982).
11. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
12. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
13. To establish a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove four
elements:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence
of special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 558 (1977).
14. See infra notes 55-107 and accompanying text.
15. See id.
16. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g, 79 T.C. 398 (1982);
see infra notes 69-92 and 108-14 and accompanying text.




the effects of the injury, but suggests that courts replace the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on state law with a uniform standard. Part II of
this Recent Development traces the evolution of the personal in-
jury exemption and the confusing judicial treatment that courts
have accorded economic damages which result from personal inju-
ries. Part III of this Recent Development discusses the most recent
treatment of economic damages by examining the Tax Court's de-
cisions in Glynn,18 Roemer,9 and Church20 and the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Roemer. Part IV advocates using the Ninth Circuit's
approach, which would allow courts to determine whether to tax
awards for injury to personal or business reputation by examining
the nature of the attacks rather than the effects of the injuries that
those attacks cause. Part IV suggests, however, that courts replace
the Roemer court's reliance on state law for determining the per-
sonal or business character of damaging attacks with a uniform
standard.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Personal Defamation Damage Exclusion
The Revenue Act of 1918 excluded from gross income
"[a]mounts received. . . as compensation for personal injuries or
sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit
or agreement on account of such injury or sickness."'" The Solici-
tor of Internal Revenue sought to limit the scope of this exclusion
by ruling that payments the taxpayer receives in a libel action are
taxable.22 The Supreme Court's intervening decision in Eisner v.
18. 76 T.C. 116 (1981), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982).
19. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
20. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
21. Ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (current version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
(1976)). In the enactment of this provision, the House Report stated:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or
health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal
injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are
required to be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides that such amounts
shall not be included in gross income.
H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 86, 92.
22. Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919). In 1920 the Solicitor ruled that an award the
taxpayer received for alienation of his wife's affections was taxable on the ground that the
statute's exclusion for "personal injuries" applied to "physical injuries only." Sol. Mem.
1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920); see Yorio, supra note 2, at 704. Courts and commentators currently
reject the distinction between physical and nonphysical injuries. See, e.g., Roemer v. Com-
missioner, 79 T.C. 398, 405 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983);
Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972); see also Moe, The Tax Effects of Tort Dam-
624 [Vol. 37:621
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Macomber, s however, limited the definition of income, thus
prompting the Solicitor to reverse his earlier decision and rule that
damages for defamation of personal reputation are not taxable.
2 4
Several years later, in the seminal case of Hawkins v. Commis-
sioner,25 the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the Solicitor's new po-
sition.2 6 The Board reasoned that "the income tax is primarily an
application of the idea of measuring taxes by financial ability to
pay, as indicated by the net accretions to one's economic wealth
during the year. '2 7 The Board concluded that compensation for in-
jury to integrity is personal and "adds nothing to the individ-




The rule that excludes from taxation awards for injuries to
personal reputation remains in force today.29 The rationale for the
rule, however, has changed. Courts and commentators today recog-
nize that a defamation recovery does more than merely make the
plaintiff whole: even the compensatory portion of the award com-
monly includes lost profits or wages, items that the government
otherwise would tax.30 Courts continue to exclude personal defa-
mation damages from gross income because of the public policy
ages, PRAC. LAW., Jan. 15, 1980, at 37, 39.
23. In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court defined income as "the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined." Id. at 207 (quoting Stratton's
Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
24. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922) (expressly modifying Sol. Mem. 957 and revok-
ing Sol. Mem. 1384, supra note 22). The Solicitor reasoned that compensation for invasion
of a personal right confers no gain or profit upon the taxpayer. I-1 C.B. at 93.
25. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927). The reason the Service assessed taxes in Hawkins on a defa-
mation recovery five years after the Solicitor conceded that these recoveries are excludable
from gross income probably is that the taxable year in issue in Hawkins was 1919-three
years before the Solicitor rendered that opinion. Therefore, the earlier Solicitor's opinion,
expressly including defamation recoveries in gross income, was in effect. See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
26. 6 B.T.A. at 1025.
27. Id. at 1024.
28. Id. at 1025.
29. See infra notes 55-114 and accompanying text.
30. Comment, supra note 6, at 674. Under the Supreme Court's most recent definition
of income, which includes "all gains except those specifically exempted," the "make whole"
rationale is particularly weak. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430
(1955). This broad definition indicates a judicial willingness to include in gross income every
accretion to wealth unless the Code specifically excludes it. But see United States v. Gotch-
er, 401 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that "exclusions from gross income are not
limited to the enumerated exclusions"). Glenshaw Glass, therefore, provides no rationale for
the exclusion of personal injury awards, other than that the Code specifically exempts them,
because the Court's formula would require an injured plaintiff to pay the same tax whether
he is indemnified or earns a profit under the recovery.
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against overburdening injured plaintiffs and because of the diffi-
culty of separating lost profits and wages from the other elements
of a personal defamation award.3 Awards for injury to nonpersonal
reputation do not receive the same tax advantage, however, be-
cause the separation difficulties and the sympathy rationale gener-
ally do not exist to the same degree as in personal injury cases. 2
B. The Distinction Between Personal and Business Reputation
The Tax Court historically has refused to recognize injury to
business reputation as personal injury. Only taxpayers that re-
ceived injuries to their personal reputations could exclude awards
from gross income. In Agar v. Commissioner," the Tax Court held
that in cases of injury to reputation, the dispositive issue courts
must address is whether the taxpayer suffered damage to his per-
sonal or to his business reputation.3 4 In Agar the taxpayer had re-
signed as treasurer and director of a company because his relation-
ship with the other members of the executive staff began to
deteriorate. 5 He then informed the company's president that he
intended to sue the company because its personnel mistreated
him. 6 The parties reached a settlement under which the company
agreed to pay the taxpayer $45,000 to "'cover all claims of any
kind and character.' ,,37 The issue before the Tax Court was
whether it should tax the taxpayer's recovery under the settlement.
The court required the taxpayer to prove that he had received the
payments in settlement of his claim for damages to his personal
reputation. 8 Even if the company had intended to make the pay-
ments in settlement of the taxpayer's proposed libel suit, the court
held that it could not exclude the payments from gross income be-
31. See Comment, supra note 6, at 674; see also supra note 2.
32. See Comment, supra note 6, at 674.
33. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1960), afl'd, 290 F.2d 283 (1961); see Lorentzen, supra note
9, at 36.
34. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 119-20.
The Service first recognized a distinction between personal and business reputation in-
jury in 1922. See Sol. Op. 132, I- C.B. 92 (1922). The Tax Court first adopted that distinc-
tion in Agar.
35. Agar v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 117.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 118.
38. Id. at 119. The court stated that the taxpayer "must bring himself squarely within
the exemption from tax upon which he bases his case; i.e., that the $45,000 was received in
settlement of his claim for damages resulting from injury to his personal reputation." Id.
The court cited Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), for support. See
19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 119; see also supra note 30 (discussing Glenshaw Glass).
[Vol. 37:621
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cause the injuries were to his business reputation.39 The court
stated that the evidence indicated company personnel had at-
tacked the taxpayer's professional judgment, not his personal char-
acter.40 The Tax Court defined personal reputation as the commu-
nity's perception of the taxpayer's honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness, and business reputation as the community's per-
ception of his professional ability and judgment.41
The Tax Court continued to distinguish between personal and
business reputation until 1978, when in Wolfson v. Commis-
sioner,43 the court questioned this dichotomy. The taxpayer in
Wolfson enrolled as a student at a medical school while also serv-
ing as a member of the school's faculty. When the Army called him
to active duty, his patients sought to obtain his deferment." One
faculty member openly accused the taxpayer of exploiting the
plight of his patients to escape military service, and the school ad-
ministration publicly denied that he was a faculty member.45 The
taxpayer filed suit and the parties reached a settlement under
which the taxpayer agreed to withdraw all claims in exchange for
the correction of the school's records and payment of $105,000.46
The issue before the Tax Court was whether to tax this payment.
The taxpayer had sued in state court for damages to his profes-
39. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 119-20. The Agar court, however, found that the record failed
to support the contention that the company made the payments in settlement of the
threatened libel suit. The court determined, to the contrary, that the payor viewed the pay-
ments as severance pay. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision stating
that:
Since we affirm upon the [severance pay] ground, we do not have to decide
whether whatever tort claim Agar may have asserted was based upon damage to his
personal as well as his business reputation, assuming that the dichotomy is realistic,
and whether all payments or a portion of them would therefore be tax exempt.
Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d at 284.
40. Agar v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 119.
41. Id.; see Lane, Tax Principles of Damages, 31 S. CAL. TAX INST. 185, 191 (1979).
42. See, e.g., Wallace v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 954, 959 (1976) (holding that
a recovery for injury to personal reputation is exempt from federal taxation but the damages
a taxpayer receives for injury to business reputation are taxable to the extent they exceed
the taxpayer's basis in that reputation); Knuckles v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182,
185 (1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965) (finding a total lack of evidence of personal
injury while recognizing that "[ilt may be that petitioner's business reputation has suffered
.... but that fact militates against him"); see also Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 37
(1972) (holding that taxation of settlements "depends on the nature of the claim settled and
not the validity of the claim" and that a settled claim for damage to reputation must com-
pensate for injury to personal reputation to escape taxation).
43. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1847-14 (1978), aff'd, 651 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1981).
44. Id. at 1847-16.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1847-18 to 1847-19.
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sional rather than his personal reputation.47 He did not argue to
the Tax Court, however, that damages for injury to professional
reputation are exempt from taxation.48 The court, therefore, de-
cided the case based on the damages that the plaintiff requested in
his state court complaint and expressly refused to decide whether a
valid distinction between personal and business reputation dam-
ages exists.49
The Wolfson decision diverged from Agar in two respects.
First, Wolfson questioned whether the distinction that Agar estab-
lished between damage to personal and professional reputation was
validY° Second, assuming the validity of the distinction, Wolfson
applied a new analysis to determine whether an injury is to per-
sonal reputation."1 The Agar court had focused primarily on
whether the damaging statement attacked the taxpayer's honesty,
integrity, and trustworthiness or insulted his business acumen and
judgment.5 2 The Wolfson court, on the other hand, determined the
type of injury the taxpayer suffered 'solely by interpreting the
wording of the complaint the taxpayer filed in his original tort ac-
tion.53 Although the Tax Court probably would have reached the
same result in each case under either analysis,54 the Wolfson deci-
sion left the rules governing taxation of damages for injury to rep-
utation in an unsettled state. Recent decisions, therefore, have at-
tempted to resolve the confusion in this area of tax law.
47. Id. at 1847-17, 1847-21.
48. The Commissioner argued that damages for injury to professional reputation are
taxable. He relied on a revenue ruling which stated that damages for defamation of one's
business reputation are in lieu of future or past income and, therefore, are taxable as ordi-
nary income. Id. at 1847-21 n.9, 1847-22 (citing Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18). The tax-
payer did not challenge the ruling probably because of the relatively strong precedent
against finding personal reputation damages that Agar and its progeny established. See
supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
49. Wolfson, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1847-21 n.9, 1847-22. The court relied solely on the
taxpayer's tort complaint in ruling that the damages were taxable even though the court had
"no doubt petitioner felt he was being called a liar; however, . . . no damages were sought
for personal slander and libel and the entire thrust of petitioner's efforts was to regain his
former position in the medical field and recognition of his proper status." Id. at 1847-21.
50. See id. at 1847-22.
51. See supra text accompanying note 49.
52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
53. See supra text accompanying note 49.
54. The taxpayers in both Agar and Wolfson came to the Tax Court with weak argu-
ments. In Agar the taxpayer complained only about accusations of bad business judgment,
and in Wolfson the taxpayer could not prove he suffered any defamatory attacks. See Lane,




From 1981 to 1983, the Tax Court faced its first three oppor-
tunities since Wolfson 55 to decide under what circumstances it
would allow taxation of damages for injuries to reputation. In
Glynn v. Commissioner,6 the first of these three cases, the Tax
Court recognized in dictum that only recovery for injuries to per-
sonal reputation are excludable from gross income. 5 In Roemer v.
Commissioner58 and Church v. Commissioner,59 the Tax Court
purportedly applied identical analyses to similar sets of facts but
reached strikingly different results. The Ninth Circuit subse-
quently reversed Roemer6" and applied an analysis that is proce-
durally novel but substantively reminiscent of the Tax Court's ear-
lier approach in Agar v. Commissioner."-
A. The Tax Court
1. Glynn v. Commissioner
In Glynn v. Commissioner,62 the Tax Court's first decision
subsequent to Wolfson concerning taxation of damages for injury
to reputation, the taxpayer alleged that he had received settlement
payments from his employer to compensate for injuries to his pro-
fessional reputation." The employer was dissatisfied with the tax-
payer's job performance and the taxpayer refused to resign because
his employer would not pay him for his accrued sick leave.6 4 The
court determined that the settlement payments were severance pay
and, therefore, were in settlement of a contract claim, not a repu-
tation injury claim. 5 The court, nevertheless, stated in dictum that
recoveries for injury to professional reputation are taxable, while
recoveries for damage to personal reputation are exempt.8 6 In do-
55. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
56. 76 T.C. 116 (1981), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982); see infra notes 62-68
and accompanying text.
57. Id. at 120.
58. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 69-92 and
accompanying text.
59. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983); see infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
60. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 108-14.
61. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1960), af'd, 290 F.2d 283 (1961); see supra notes 33-41 and
accompanying text.
62. 76 T.C. 116 (1981), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982).
63. Id. at 120.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 120-21.
66. The court stated that
1984]
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ing so, the court impliedly followed the reasoning that Agar set
forth67 and made no reference to the statement in Wolfson that a
valid distinction between personal and professional reputation may
not exist."e
2. Roemer v. Commissioner
In Roemer v. Commissionere the taxpayer, an independent in-
surance broker, applied for an agency license from a life insurance
company.70 As part of the application, the company requested a
report from a credit reporting service. The report was "grossly de-
famatory,"71 falsely accusing the taxpayer of incompetence72 and
dishonesty.73 The credit reporting company, upon the taxpayer's
demand, issued a retraction, but it contained further false and de-
famatory insinuations regarding the taxpayer's business abilities
and personal character. 74 When the insurance company denied the
taxpayer an agency license, he brought an action for libe7 5 against
payments for injury to professional reputation are not excludable from gross income,
since any damages alleged to have been paid as a result of such injury would not fall
within the exclusion afforded payments for injuries to personal reputation. Rather,
they would more properly be characterized as payments made in satisfaction of injuries
to petitioner's business reputation as compensation for past or future income which
might have been or might be lost, and thus, being compensatory by nature, would be
taxable as ordinary income.
Id. at 120.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Actually, the Tax Court in Glynn foreshadowed the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Roemer
even though the Glynn court held that the taxpayer received payments because of his con-
tractual rights. In answer to the taxpayer's contention that he became ill as a result of the
dispute with his employer, and that the payments compensated him for this infirmity, the
court stated that "it should be evident that the consequences of a dispute are not necessa-
rily commensurate with its origin." Glynn, 76 T.C. at 121. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held
that the consequences of an injury are not necessarily commensurate with its nature. See
infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
69. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 400.
71. Id.
72. The report stated that the taxpayer was an incompetent salesman because he ne-
glected his clients' affairs. Id.
73. The report implied that the taxpayer misappropriated funds for his personal bene-
fit. Id.
74. Id.
75. The taxpayer sued in California. Under California law, "[l]ibel is a false and un-
privileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to
the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes
him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation."
CAL. CIv. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
1984] DEFAMATION RECOVERIES 631
the credit reporting service.76 The jury awarded him compensatory
and punitive damages, and litigation costs.
77
In the Tax Court the taxpayer argued that the damages were
not taxable because the jury awarded them for personal injuries
and, therefore, section 104(a)(2) applied. 7s The Commissioner re-
sponded that the compensatory damages were taxable because the
award compensated the taxpayer for damage to his business or
professional reputation and, therefore, section 104(a)(2) did not
apply.70 To determine whether the taxpayer suffered injury to his
personal or his business reputation, the court examined the allega-
tions the taxpayer made in his complaint in the libel suit.80 The
76. Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975).
77. Id. at 930, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
Although awards for injury to reputation often include compensatory, punitive, and
cost elements, the determination whether to tax compensatory damages is dispositive of
whether the punitive and cost reimbursements are taxable. Punitive damages generally are
taxable. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). The Service in 1958
applied the Glenshaw Glass doctrine to include in gross income punitive damages received
in a defamation suit. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18. Since then, the Service has reversed
its position and ruled that "any damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received on
account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from gross income." Rev. Rul. 75-45,
1975-1 C.B. 47.
Cost reimbursements also are not taxable if they are part of a personal injury recovery.
If the injury is nonpersonal, then the reimbursement is includable in gross income, but the
taxpayer may deduct his costs as an expense of income production. See I.R.C. § 212(1)
(1976). No § 212 deduction exists for a reimbursement award in a personal injury case be-
cause the award produces no income and because the Code does not allow a deduction when
the compensatory and punitive elements of the award are tax-exempt. See I.R.C. § 265(1)
(1976). Cost reimbursements, therefore, have a zero net tax effect regardless of whether the
taxpayer's injury is personal, but the procedures for arriving at that effect vary according to
the character of the injury. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983)
(adding that the costs which produced interest income on the award were includable in
gross income and deductible under I.R.C. § 212(1), even though the injury was personal).
78. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 404; see supra text accompanying note 1.
79. Id. The Commissioner relied heavily on Glynn. The taxpayer made a persuasive
argument that because the cause of action in Glynn was in contract and not in tort, the
court was speaking only in dictum when it stated that the distinction between personal and
business reputation was still viable. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-4, Roemer v. Commis-
sioner, 716 F.2d 693 (1983); see also Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 120 (1981), aff'd
mem., 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982); supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
80. Paragraph III of the taxpayer's amended complaint in the libel action stated:
That at all times prior to the publication of the matters herein complained of,
plaintiff has enjoyed a good name and business reputation, both generally and in par-
ticular with respect to high standards of business, service rendered to clients, credit
standing, honesty, integrity, financial responsibility; that by reason of this excellent
name and reputation, plaintiff has enjoyed the continued patronage of his clients and
of insurance companies he represents; that the continued patronage of plaintiff and the
respect of his clients and companies depends on the good name and reputation of
plaintiff for honesty, integrity, quality of service, financial responsibility, credit stand-
ing and high standards of business practice.
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court concluded that the taxpayer had claimed recovery predomi-
nantly for damage to his professional reputation as an insurance
broker."' Because the effects of the injuries for which the taxpayer
recovered were business-related, the court reasoned that the dam-
age award was taxable.82
The dissenting judges argued that a valid distinction did not
exist between defamatory injury to personal reputation and defam-
atory injury to business reputation." Judge Forrester in the lead
dissent opined that business or professional reputation is only one
aspect of a person's general reputation in the community. He felt
that all persons have a single intangible reputation with personal
and professional sides.8 4 These two sides of reputation are often
indistinguishable.8 5 Thus, Judge Forrester believed that damage
awards for injury to both personal and professional reputation
should be excludable from gross income because those aspects of a
person's general reputation are inseparable.8 8 He suggested, there-
fore, that the court should distinguish between injury to reputation
and injury to occupation. If the defamatory statements injured the
taxpayer's personal reputation-his character, honesty, or personal
habits, for example-then his recovery should be excludable from
79 T.C. at 401.
81. After reviewing the pleadings, testimony, and other evidence in the libel suit, the
court declared:
[The taxpayer] told the jury that other insurance licenses were denied him as a result
of the defamatory qualification report. He told the jury that he lost income as a direct
result of the false report. He described in detail to the jury how the defamatory report
affected his business relations, but said little, if anything, about how it affected his
personal affairs. The evidence presented through many witnesses in the trial of the
libel suit was primarily directed at how the petitioner's business relationships and
planned business ventures were harmed by the false report of [the credit reporting
company]. There was no testimony by the petitioner or others in the libel suit that the
libelous report was published anywhere outside of the insurance industry.
Id. at 401-02.
82. Id. at 407.
83. 79 T.C. at 411 (Forrester, J., dissenting). Judge Forrester wrote the lead dissent,
which Judge Korner joined. Judge Wilbur also wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 413; see
infra note 92. The dissents are enlightening because, although the Ninth Circuit did not cite
either of them in reversing the Tax Court decision, the Ninth Circuit did adopt a similar
approach. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); infra notes 108-14 and
accompanying text.
84. 79 T.C. at 411. In Roemer, differentiating between professional reputation and
personal reputation was particularly difficult. The taxpayer built a lucrative insurance prac-
tice by making friends and acquaintances through membership in social and civic organiza-
tions and then soliciting their business. As a result, most of the taxpayer's business clients
were also his friends. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 411-12.
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gross income under section 104(a)(2).7 If the defamatory state-
ments, however, attacked the taxpayer's occupational abilities-his
professional competence, for example-then the recovery would be
wholly business-related and, therefore, outside the scope of section
104(a)(2).8'
The dissent stressed that the trier of fact must determine
"whether .. .professional injury and lost profits are the injury
sought to be compensated, or are merely. . . the collateral effects
of injury to reputation in an effort to prove the extent or severity
of the damages."89 After listing the important factors in this deter-
mination,90 Judge Forrester found that the occupational damages
in Roemer were merely evidence of injury to the taxpayer's reputa-
tion.91 He reasoried that the taxpayer had offered evidence of the
credit report's adverse effects upon his business to convince the
jury that the report injured him. According to the dissent, the
showing of economic loss was only an objective substitute for sub-
jective evidence that the credit reporting service hurt and humili-
ated the taxpayer.2
87. Id. at 412.
88. Id. The dissent gave an example of a defamatory statement that would injure only
a person's occupational opportunities: if a defamatory remark about an automobile dealer's
work product tortiously injured the dealer, the recovery would be wholly business-related
and outside the scope of § 104(a)(2). Id. If a person falsely accused the dealer of "padding"
the number of working hours spent on a particular job, however, the dissent seemingly
would hold the dealer's damages excludable under § 104(a)(2) because the accusation at-
tacked an element of the dealer's personal reputation-his honesty-rather than his occupa-
tional competence.
89. Id. at 412 (emphasis in original).
90. The dissent stated:
The determination [of whether the injury is to reputation or occupation] will have to
be made on the basis of all the facts and circumstances. While no single factor should
be determinative, the following factors are among those which should be considered:
(1) The statements made, i.e., whether they are directed at the person's character (hon-
esty, personal habits, etc.) or at his occupation (incompetence, etc.); (2) the geographic
area where the statement is published relative to the taxpayer's business and residence;
(3) the nature of the taxpayer's occupation; (4) the definitional nature of the action
under local law; (5) the relief sought in the complaint; (6) the arguments presented to
the jury; (7) the classification (if any) of the damages awarded; and (8) the evidence
presented to the jury.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 413. In a second dissenting opinion, Judge Wilbur criticized the majority
opinion on several grounds. He agreed with the lead dissent that whether the damages in a
given case compensate the taxpayer for lost income is irrelevant because § 104(a)(2) ex-
empts defamation damages from federal taxation. To illustrate what he considered the
anomaly that the majority holding created by taxing defamation damages, Judge Wilbur
pointed out that a young surgeon who loses a finger recovers damages that replace otherwise
taxable future earnings, but § 104(a)(2) does not require bifurcation of that award into per-
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3. Church v. Commissioner
In Church v. Commissioner9 3 the taxpayer, Attorney General
of Arizona, delivered a speech about the excessive influence of cer-
tain lobbies upon the Arizona State Legislature. In response to this
speech, a Phoenix daily newspaper published an article calling him
a communist." The taxpayer brought an action for libel against
the newspaper in an Arizona state court.9 5 A jury awarded him
compensatory and punitive damages, but did not indicate its
method of arriving at the award.9 6 The Tax Court addressed the
issue of whether the compensatory damages were taxable.9 7 Church
asserted that the award compensated him for damage to his per-
sonal reputation and, therefore, was excludable from gross income
sonal and economic components. Id. at 414.
Judge Wilbur also argued that damages for injury to reputation should be excludable
from gross income because state law recognizes that reputation injuries are as personal to
the taxpayer as loss of limb. Id. Judge Wilbur recognized that "federal tax consequences
often flow from, or turn on, the legal characterization of a transaction or cause of action
under State law." Id. He expressed concern, however, that
[t]he majority has reversed the process, characterizing the cause of action under State
law in accordance with the misperceived exigencies of Federal tax law. We are cited to
no authority in the field of tort law or libel for the bifurcation of a defamation action
into categories corresponding to components of damage.
Id. Judge Wilbur then turned to tort law authorities and found that defamation is an inva-
sion of the personal "'interest in reputation and good name."' Id. at 414 n.1 (quoting W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971)). Rather than divide
this personal interest into components, Judge Wilbur believed that all damages resulting
from interference with a taxpayer's personal reputation are personal injuries within the
scope of § 104(a)(2). His theory relied upon the recognition that a separate cause of action
would lie for falsehoods that are not personally defamatory ("injurious falsehoods"), and
that any recovery for these torts presumably would be wholly business-related and thus
completely taxable. 79 T.C. at 414 n.1 (citing W. PROSSER, supra, § 128, at 915-16). See
supra note 88 and accompanying text; infra note 137 and accompanying text.
Finally, Judge Wilbur alluded to one of the key arguments for excluding from taxation
damages for economic loss that result from any injury-the income bunching problem. See
79 T.C. at 414. Commentators recognize that taxing economic opportunities that would have
produced earnings over a period of years as a one-time lump sum at the ordinary income
rate is inappropriate. See, e.g., Yorio, supra note 2, at 714-19.
93. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983). The Tax Court filed Roemer on August 30, 1982, and Church
on June 20, 1983. The Ninth Circuit filed its Roemer opinion on September 22, 1983.
94. 80 T.C. at 1105.
95. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church, 24 Ariz. App. 287, 537 P.2d 1345 (1975).
96. 80 T.C. at 1106.
97. The Commissioner conceded that if the court viewed the jury award as personal
injury damages, then both the compensatory and punitive elements of the recovery should
be exempt from taxation. Id. at 1106, 1110 n.7; see supra note 77 (discussing taxation of
punitive damages). The court held that the taxpayer's costs of suit were deductible only to
the extent that they produced interest on the award. 80 T.C. at 1110-11; see supra note 77
(discussing taxation of cost reimbursements).
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as a personal injury award under section 104(a)(2)." 8 The Commis-
sioner contended that the Tax Court's recent decision in Roemer99
required the court to find that the jury award was for business-
related injuries. 100
Applying the Roemer court analysis, the Church court began
by examining the allegations in the taxpayer's complaint, the evi-
dence that he presented, and the arguments he made in the libel
suit.10 1 The court concluded that the entire thrust of the taxpayer's
libel case was that the defamatory article affected him person-
ally.1 02 The court found that the award compensated him for the
humiliation, public embarrassment, pain, suffering, and emotional
distress that came from being labeled a "communist."103 Although
a substantial portion of the award compensated the taxpayer for
loss of his political career, the court distinguished that part of the
recovery from the compensation for loss of income in Roemer.
10 4
The court felt that it would be applying the Roemer test too
broadly if it held that the defamatory article injured the taxpayer's
professional reputation solely because it ended his political ca-
reer.105 To tax all or part of a recovery, the court would have to
require that an element of the recovery compensate for loss of
profits or earnings.10o The court noted that not only did the tax-
payer not attempt to prove such a loss, but also that he might have
been unable to prove it, since he probably would earn more in pri-
vate law practice than he would have earned as a public official.
10 7
98. 80 T.C. at 1106.
99. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 69-92 and
accompanying text.
100. 80 T.C. at 1106.
101. Id. at 1107-08.
102. Id. at 1108-09.
103. Id. at 1108.
104. Id. at 1108-09.
105. Id. at 1109. The court stated:
In our opinion, shattered dreams, ruined careers, and the mental anguish that follow
[sic] are just as personal as, for instance, loss of limb. . . . The distinction [from Roe-
mer] in this case is that the jury in this defamation proceeding simply did not intend
to compensate petitioner for injury to his professional or business reputation to the
extent it affected past or future income.
Id. at 1109-10 (citations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1108 n.4.
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B. The Ninth Circuit
In Roemer v. Commissioner0 8 the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court's decision and held that the taxpayer's damage award in
state court was for a personal injury and, therefore, was not taxa-
ble. The Ninth Circuit felt that the Tax Court confused the effects
of the injury a damaging statement causes with the nature of the
statement itself.109 The court stated that taxing recoveries for
damage to reputation depends on whether the state in which the
taxpayer brings his tort claim recognizes the statement as a per-
sonal attack.110 The court held that the state of California, in
which the Roemer taxpayer brought his tort claim, recognizes that
the cause of action for defamation protects a personal right."' Cal-
ifornia also allows actions for the related business torts of dispar-
agement and trade libel, which provide a remedy for attacks on the
quality of one's goods or services.1 2 Because the taxpayer filed an
action for personal defamation,11 3 however, the court concluded
that the damages, both compensatory and punitive,'1 4 were for a
108. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra text accompanying notes 69-76 for a dis-
cussion of the facts and allegations in Roemer.
109. The court reasoned:
Although there are different types of defamation actions (libel or slander) depend-
ing on the form of the defamatory statements, all defamatory statements attack an
individual's good name. This injury to the person should not be confused with the
derivative consequences of the defamatory attack, i.e., the loss of reputation in the
community and any resulting loss of income. The nonpersonal consequences of a per-
sonal injury, such as a loss of future income, are often the most persuasive means of
proving the extent of the injury that was suffered. The personal nature of an injury
should not be defined by its effect.
[A] defamatory attack on one's character should not be confused with the
damage to a person's reputation that flows from that injury. Frequently, as a result of
defamatory statements attacking one's character, the individual suffers an impairment
of his or her relationships with others. While some of these relationships may be per-
sonal and some may be professional, all of the harm that is done flows from the same
personal attack on the defamed individual.
Id. at 699-700 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit held that because the Tax Court con-
fused the attack with its effects, it illogically distinguished between physical and nonphysi-
cal injuries. Id. at 697; see supra note 92.
110. 716 F.2d at 697.
111. Id. at 699. See supra note 75 for the text of the relevant California statute.
112. 716 F.2d at 699; see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
113. 716 F.2d at 700.
114. The court acknowledged that punitive damages are ordinarily includable in gross
income, but it recognized that the Commissioner liberally interprets § 104(a)(2) to exempt
from taxation punitive as well as compensatory damages for personal injuries. In addition,
the court followed the well-settled law regarding the taxation and deduction of reimbursed
costs. 716 F.2d at 700; see supra note 77.
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personal injury under section 104(a)(2) and, therefore, were not
taxable.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Problems with the Tax Court's Recent Approach
The tax law governing defamation damage awards has
changed greatly since the Hawkins court" 5 first decided to exclude
such awards from gross income under the rationale that they serve
only to make the plaintiff whole.1 6 The Hawkins analysis was too
broad because it considered even damages for lost profits or earn-
ings as attempts to make the plaintiff whole. In Agar 7 the Tax
Court distinguished between injury to personal reputation and in-
jury to business reputation and held that recoveries for injury to
business reputation were outside the scope of section 104(a)(2).118
The Tax Court and other authorities" 9 abandoned the Hawkins
"make whole" rationale and implicitly recognized that the govern-
ment does not tax defamation awards because of the public policy
against overburdening injured plaintiffs, and because the pecuni-
ary and nonpecuniary elements of these awards are difficult to sep-
arate. The Agar court felt that courts would not serve these policy
considerations if they excluded business-related damage awards
from taxation.
When the Agar court distinguished between personal reputa-
tion and business or professional reputation as the means of deter-
mining whether defamation damages are taxable, the court also es-
tablished a method of making that distinction. Under Agar the
court would find a personal injury whenever the damaging state-
ment attacked the taxpayer's integrity, honesty, or trustworthi-
ness, and would find a nonpersonal injury whenever the statement
attacked his business acumen, competence, or judgment. 2 ' The
Wolfson' 2' court, however, diverged from the Agar approach. It fo-
cused almost exclusively on the language of the complaint the
115. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927); see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
117. Agar v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.
1961); see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
118. 19 T.C.M. at 119-20; see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 2.
120. 19 T.C.M. at 119; see Lane, supra note 41, at 191; supra text accompanying note
41.
121. Wolfson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1847-14 (1978), aff'd, 651 F.2d 1228
(6th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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taxpayer filed in his tort action to determine the type of injuries
that prompted his damages suit. The Wolfson analysis demon-
strates the potential for heavy reliance on the taxpayer's tort
complaint.
A comparison of the Tax Court's decisions in Roemer'22 and
Church'23 illustrates the undesirable results that can occur when
the court relies upon the language of the defamation complaint to
determine whether the injury was to the taxpayer's personal or
professional reputation. The Roemer court found that the taxpayer
in his complaint sought compensation for loss of prospective in-
come. 12 4 The court held, therefore, that the taxpayer suffered harm
to his business reputation and thus could not claim a section
104(a)(2) exclusion.125 In Church, the Tax Court also focused on
the defamation action complaint. The Church court, however, held
that the taxpayer did not seek damages for lost earnings. 2 As a
result, although the court recognized that "a substantial portion of
the award was intended to compensate [the taxpayer] for the loss
of a professional career,"' 27 it concluded that the injury was to the
taxpayer's personal reputation, and he, therefore, could claim a
section 104(a)(2) exclusion. 28
Although the Tax Court decided Roemer and Church within
one year of each other, they are obviously inconsistent. The tax-
payer in each case suffered damage to both his career and his per-
sonal reputation in the community. The Roemer taxpayer proved
his injury by showing the loss of future income. 29 The Church tax-
payer also suffered some lost earnings' 0 but chose to prove his in-
jury with evidence of public embarrassment and humiliation. Al-
though the nature of the injuries in both cases was defamation, the
tax consequences depended upon the effects of the injuries. This
approach presents two problems. First, the language that the
plaintiff uses in drafting his tort action complaint determines
122. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983);
see supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
123. Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104 (1983); see supra notes 93-107 and accom-
panying text.
124. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 406; see supra notes 80-81 and accompany-
ing text.
125. 79 T.C. at 407; see supra text accompanying note 82.
126. See 80 T.C. at 1107-08.
127. Id. at 1108.
128. Id. at 1110.
129. 79 T.C. at 406.
130. 80 T.C. at 1108 n.4.
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whether the defamation award is excludable from gross income.
Under this reasoning, the Tax Court in Roemer would have
reached the opposite result if the taxpayer had alleged that he suf-
fered humiliation rather than that he lost prospective income." 1
Similarly, the result in Church would have been different if the
taxpayer had sued for lost earnings rather than pain and suffer-
ing. 13 2 The court's approach, therefore, rewards provident taxpay-
ers who draft tort complaints seeking compensation for pain and
suffering rather than for economic loss.
The second problem with the Tax Court's approach is that it
yields results that are inconsistent with the interpretation of sec-
tion 104(a)(2) in the context of recoveries for physical personal in-
juries. As Judge Wilbur illustrated in his Roemer dissent, the law
does not require a young surgeon who collects damages for a lost
thumb to bifurcate his award into economic and personal compo-
nents even though the award replaces otherwise taxable future
earnings. 13 3 The entire award is within the scope of the section
104(a)(2) exclusion. Under Roemer and Church, however, the eco-
nomic loss components of a defamation award are not exempt from
taxation because they do not fall within the exclusion. The Tax
Court has drawn a distinction between the tax status of awards for
physical and nonphysical injuries, although section 104(a)(2) inher-
ently recognizes a distinction only between personal and nonper-
sonal injuries. Even the Service has conceded that certain non-
physical injuries, including defamation, are personal.13 4 The Tax
Court, therefore, should not apply a standard that imposes differ-
ent tax consequences on physical and nonphysical personal injury
131. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 413 (Forrester, J., dissenting); supra text
accompanying note 92.
132. The taxpayers in these cases probably sued for the damages that they could
prove best. The taxpayer in Roemer experienced definite income loss, while the taxpayer in
Church probably could prove very little income loss because he might have earned more in
private practice than he would have in public office. See supra text accompanying note 107.
But see Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. at 1108 n.4 (indicating evidence of some lost in-
come). In addition, allegations of humiliation and lost income are not mutually exclusive.
The Tax Court's analysis alone, therefore, might not induce taxpayers to sue for nonpecu-
niary damages rather than economic loss. In reasonably close cases, however, the Tax
Court's approach provides taxpayers with the incentive to seek damages for emotional in-
jury rather than economic loss.
133. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 414 (Wilbur, J., dissenting); supra note
92.
134. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983); Sol. Op. 132, I-1
C.B. 92 (1922) (damages for defamation of personal character, alienation of affections, and
surrender of child custody rights represent recovery for invasion of personal rights and thus
do not constitute income).
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awards.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Search for a Solution
The Ninth Circuit reversed Roemer,13 discarded the Tax
Court's approach, and focused instead on the nature of the tort for
which the taxpayer recovered to determine whether he suffered
personal injury.1386 The Ninth Circuit found that the taxpayer's in-
jury was personal because defamation is an invasion of the per-
sonal interest in reputation and good name.13 7 Although the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on state tort law presents practical problems, 35 it
solved the two greatest weaknesses of the Tax Court's approach.
The first problem with the Tax Court's analysis in Church and
Roemer was that it encouraged plaintiffs to "draft around" the
taxation of defamation damages by alleging nonpecuniary rather
than economic injuries in their tort complaints. The Ninth Circuit
solved that problem by focusing on the state court's judgment
rather than the language of the taxpayer's tort complaint. The tax-
payer's only incentive under the Ninth Circuit's approach, then, is
to pursue a defamation action rather than a claim for injurious
falsehood.3 9 Plaintiffs, however, already have an incentive to allege
defamation because it is easier to prove than injurious falsehood.
1 40
135. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 108-14
and accompanying text.
136. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d at 699. The court relied on state law in mak-
ing this determination because the federal common law of torts no longer existed, Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), and the Code did not define personal injury. Roe-
mer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d at 697; see United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197
(1971) (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (state law creates legal interests;
federal law determines method and timing of taxation)). But see Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457, 465 (1967) (even when underlying substantive federal tax rule
relies on state law, lower state court rulings are not controlling).
137. See 716 F.2d at 699; W. PRossER, supra note 92, § 111, at 737.
138. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
139. Injurious falsehood is an attack on goods or services that gives rise to an action
for disparagement of title to property or disparagement of quality. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 623A (1977). A defendant is liable for injurious falsehood if he publishes a false
statement harmful to the interests of another, recognized or should recognize that the publi-
cation is likely to do harm, and knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disre-
gard of its truth or falsity. Id. Although the majority of the injurious falsehood cases con-
cern attacks upon title to or the quality of a person's property, the existence of property is
not a necessary element of the tort. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 128, at 918-19. The gist of
injurious falsehood is the interference with an advantageous economic relation. A person is
liable, for example, if he attacks the existence, character, employees, or customers of an-
other's business or profession, or the quality of the services the business provides. Id. at 919.
140. At common law, injurious falsehood is more difficult to prove than defamation for
three reasons. First, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the injurious statement was
false; courts presume falsity in defamation actions and truth is an affirmative defense. Sec-
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The Ninth Circuit's approach, therefore, rarely should affect the
plaintiff's decision to bring one reputation injury action instead of
another.
141
When the taxpayer's recovery is in the form of a settlement,
the Ninth Circuit presumably would focus on the nature of the at-
tack for which the payor intended to settle, rather than the effects
of the injury the payor intended to compensate. 142 In settlement
cases under the Ninth Circuit's approach the parties have an in-
centive to agree that the allegedly harmful statements attacked the
injured party's character rather than his occupation. That incen-
tive, however, is no greater than the incentive to agree, under the
Tax Court's approach, that the payments compensated for emo-
tional distress or humiliation rather than lost earnings. In either
case, the task of the court considering whether to tax the settle-
ment is to determine the actual intent of the payor.
The second problem with the Tax Court's analysis in Church
and Roemer was that it treated physical and nonphysical injuries
differently. 143 A person's ability to conduct his business is no less
personal than a surgeon's ability to conduct surgery. Under the
Tax Court's approach, however, the surgeon's recovery for a lost
thumb is exempt from taxation, while the businessman's recovery
for an attack upon the ability to perform his job is taxable. 4 4 The
ond, in injurious falsehood actions the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement; in defamation actions the de-
fendant is strictly liable. Last, an injurious falsehood action requires proof of pecuniary loss;
in the majority of defamation actions the plaintiff need not prove such special damages.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A comment g (1977). The Supreme Court, however,
has held that the United States Constitution in some cases requires defamation plaintiffs to
meet a higher standard of proof than strict liability. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The courts have
not yet determined the effect those decisions will have on the distinction between the defa-
mation and injurious falsehood causes of action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A
comment g (1977).
141. If the Tax Court had followed Agar in later cases, it also could have discouraged
plaintiffs from drafting tax-motivated tort action complaints. Like the Ninth Circuit in Roe-
mer, the Agar court avoided focusing on the language of the plaintiff's complaint to deter-
mine whether to tax his damages. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
142. Courts generally look to the intent of the payor to determine whether the pay-
ment is for personal injuries. See, e.g., Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir.
1965); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961).
143. Although the Tax Court's approach in Agar would have solved the complaint-
drafting problem, supra note 141, it would not have treated physical and nonphysical inju-
ries alike. The attack on the taxpayer's business acumen and judgment was as personal as a
physical injury, yet the Agar court taxed the recovery.
144. Statements that impute conduct, condition, or character incompatible with a per-
son's business, trade, profession, or office give rise to a cause of action in defamation. W.
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Ninth Circuit's approach in Roemer avoids this inconsistency by
recognizing that the distinction inherent in section 104(a)(2) is be-
tween personal and nonpersonal injuries, not physical and non-
physical injuries.
Although the Ninth Circuit has developed the most sound ap-
proach to date, the court's reliance on state law to determine the
nature of the injury for which a taxpayer recovered damages
presents two problems. First, the reliance on state law could lead
to inconsistent results. For example, different states might treat
identical attacks on reputation differently, depending on the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. 145 Therefore, federal courts in-
terpreting state decisions could impose inconsistent tax liability
upon taxpayers from different states. For instance, most states
provide that if a client falsely and publicly accuses his attorney of
incompetence, the attorney can sue the client for defamation,'
4 6
even though the attorney's business and personal reputation both
suffer. In a minority jurisdiction, however, the attorney's cause of
action might lie in disparagement of quality of services'47-a busi-
ness tort-and the federal court, under Roemer, would tax the re-
covery. That the drafters of section 104(a)(2) intended to create a
tax law which is capable of yielding such inconsistent results is
doubtful.
The second problem with the Ninth Circuit's reliance on state
law is that it creates inefficiency. The Roemer opinion shows the
PROSSER, supra note 92, § 112, at 758; see Comment. Product Disparagement and False
Advertising in the Common and Civil Law, 53 TuL. L. REV. 190, 192 (1978). A defamation
action, therefore, should lie for a statement wrongly accusing someone of being incompetent
to perform the duties incident to his calling. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 112, at 758; see
Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273, 52 A.2d 476 (1947) (liability for alleging plaintiff's incapac-
ity to hold his office); MacInnis v. National Herald Printing Co., 140 Minn. 171, 167 N.W.
550 (1918) (liability for alleging that plaintiff was not a citizen while he held an office which
required citizenship); Cruikshank v. Gordon, 118 N.Y. 178, 23 N.E. 457 (1890) (liability for
calling a doctor a "butcher"); Stevens v. Morse, 185 Wis. 500, 201 N.W. 815 (1925) (liability
for stating that a farm labor organizer was ignorant of farming).
145. Courts generally find that an allegation of professional incompetence constitutes
defamation. See supra note 144. This rule might fail, however, in an individual case. It
would fail, for example, if the taxpayer alleged only injurious falsehood in his complaint. In
addition, because this area of tort law is so fact-specific, different courts in the same state
might render inconsistent results even though the plaintiffs made similar allegations. These
potential inconsistencies demonstrate that even courts in the same state are not reliable
guides for federal courts determining whether to tax damages for injury to a plaintiff's
reputation.
146. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (allegation of incompetence in one's
calling gives rise to cause of action in defamation).
147. For example, a state court expressly might equate an accusation that an attorney
is incompetent with a statement that his legal services are inadequate.
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substantial effort that a court must exert when relying on state law
to determine the nature of the tort for which the taxpayer recov-
ered. 14 The Ninth Circuit went into great detail 49 to determine
that under California law defamation invades a personal right.150
Even in a relatively simple case like Roemer, in which the taxpayer
clearly indicated in his state complaint the tort for which he sued
and a trial court directly had addressed the tort action, the court
hearing the tax issue still had to analyze state law substantially to
determine the nature of that tort.151
The inefficiencies that arise when a federal court looks to state
law in an attempt to determine the federal question of taxation of
damages which a plaintiff receives for a reputation injury are most
noteworthy in two common situations. The first situation occurs
when the taxpayer alleges both defamation and a business tort in
his complaint, the jury instructions and recovery do not reveal the
tort for which the jury awarded damages, and an appellate opinion
is not available for the federal court's scrutiny. The second situa-
tion arises when the taxpayer receives his payment in settle-
ment.152 In these situations, the federal courts following Roemer
would have the difficult task of determining what tort the jury or
parties to the settlement intended to remedy before ever address-
ing whether state law characterizes the tort as personal or nonper-
sonal. Federal courts have yet to devise an approach that is effi-
cient and consistent in its application, but which follows Roemer's
lead in discouraging plaintiffs from drafting tax-motivated tort ac-
tion complaints.
C. The Recommended Approach: A Uniform Standard
Congress should impose a uniform standard that the courts
should apply to determine whether a taxpayer who recovers for
damage to his reputation received his award for personal injuries.
If Congress is reluctant to provide guidance, courts should devise
148. The court devoted almost half of its analysis to California defamation law. See
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697-99.
149. The court traced California law back to 1850-the year the state entered the
Union. Id. at 697.
150. See id.
151. Although critics might argue that the Ninth Circuit meticulously analyzed Cali-
fornia law only because the court was applying a novel approach, and that future judges
trying similar cases only will need to glance at state law to determine if an attack invaded a
personal right, this argument fails to recognize that future cases might have more complex
facts.
152. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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an adequate approach on their own. Courts can use the following
test to determine the nature of the recovery: Did the alleged state-
ment attack the injured party's person or his business? 15 3 If the
statement attacked the taxpayer's person, the recovery would be
exempt from taxation under section 104(a)(2) because it arose "on
account of" a personal injury.154 If the statement attacked the tax-
payer's business, however, the proposed standard would require
taxing the recovery because it arose out of a business injury. For
example, if a person falsely and publicly calls the taxpayer an in-
competent attorney and he recovers, he does not have to pay taxes
on the recovery because the statement attacks his personal ability.
If the tortfeasor, however, states that the taxpayer's law firm has
the worst location and the most dishonest clients of any firm in
town, then the award would be taxable because the statement at-
tacks the business entity and not the person of the taxpayer him-
self.155 Even when the taxpayer is a sole practitioner, therefore, the
153. This standard substantively approximates the approach that the majority of state
courts apply in determining whether an injured party's cause of action lies in defamation or
in injurious falsehood. In a defamation case, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a
"statement concerning another." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 558 (1977). In an inju-
rious falsehood case, however, the plaintiff must offer evidence of a "statement harmful to
the interests of another." Id. at § 623A (emphasis added). Under the Restatement, a remark
attacking the method by which an individual runs his business would "concern" that person
and, thus, constitute an element of defamation because it would impute "a lack of qualities
which the public has a right to expect of the plaintiff in his calling." W. PROSSER, supra note
92, § 112, at 759; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573 comment c & illustration 4 (if
one's calling requires a particular skill or ability, a statement that implies a lack of that skill
or ability is not only actionable in defamation, but is so actionable without proof of special
harm; thus, an assertion that a lawyer is "ignorant and unqualified to practice law" would
subject the defendant to liability without plaintiff's proof of special harm). The proposed
approach would yield the same result because the statement attacked the injured party's
person. On the other hand, a statement about the plaintiff's business-its character, cus-
tomers, employees, or existence, for example-would not "concern" the owner but would
harm his "interest." His cause of action under the Restatement, therefore, would be for
injurious falsehood. See RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 623A comment g (1977) ("[i]f the
statement reflects merely upon the quality of what the plaintiff has to sell or solely on the
character of his business, then it is injurious falsehood alone"); see also W. PROSSER, supra
note 92, § 128, at 919 nn.49-53 (citing injurious falsehood cases concerning business dispar-
agement). Again, the suggested approach would achieve the same result because the state-
ment attacked the owner's business, not his personal ability to conduct that business. For
cases holding that defamation concerns the person and that injurious falsehood relates to
the person's business or goods, see Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227, 232, 235
(3rd Cir. 1941); Shores v. Chip Steak Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 627, 630, 279 P.2d 595, 597
(1955); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Employees, 400
11. 38, 49-50, 79 N.E.2d 46, 52 (1948).
154. See supra text accompanying note 1.
155. The suggested standard is similar to the approach that Judge Forrester espoused
in his Roemer dissent at the Tax Court level. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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suggested approach would allow a court to look to whether the
harmful statement attacked his ability to run the practice-an ele-
ment of his person-or the business itself.'56
The proposal would ensure consistency in the taxation of rep-
utation injury recoveries among taxpayers in different states be-
cause it would replace reliance on state tort law with a uniform
standard for determining the nature of injuries. The new standard
also would cure the inefficiency that the Ninth Circuit created in
Roemer because federal courts no longer would need to analyze
state law to determine the federal tax consequences of an award
for injury to reputation. The proposed test would be particularly
efficient in cases in which the tort for which the taxpayer recovered
is not readily apparent.15 7 In these situations, the Roemer analysis
would require two separate state law determinations: first, the fed-
eral court must determine for what tort the taxpayer recovered
and, second, the court must decide whether that tort constitutes a
personal injury under state law. A court applying the recom-
mended test, however, would focus only on whether the injurious
statement attacked the person himself; if it did, the recovery would
not be taxable. Although the proposed approach still could require
significant factfinding in settled cases and cases in which the trial
court's judgment is ambiguous about the tortfeasor's remarks, the
standard allows the federal courts to make that determination effi-
ciently and without the danger of the inconsistency inherent in
Roemer's reliance on state law.
The proposed test, however, goes one step further by distinguishing between a person and
his business rather than between a person's reputation and his occupation because the test
recognizes that an allegation of occupational incompetence is as "personal" as a physical
injury. Under Judge Forrester's approach, recoveries for statements alleging occupational
incompetence are nonpersonal and, thus, taxable. The proposal, on the other hand, recog-
nizes that an allegation of occupational incompetence is as "personal" as an allegation of
dishonesty and, therefore, is not taxable. See generally supra notes 88 & 90 (setting out an
application of Judge Forrester's analysis and the factors he considered).
156. A meaningful distinction between the sole proprietor's ability to run his business
and the business itself does exist, and the proposed mode of analysis would allow courts to
resolve the federal taxation issue based upon that distinction. For example, a false allegation
regarding the firm's existence or its clients clearly attacks the business itself and not the
taxpayer's person, even though he is a sole practitioner. Even the solely owned business has
elements in addition to and independent from its owner, like the quality and location of the
building in which the businessman does his work, the sophistication of the firm's office
equipment, and the competence of its support staff. If the tortfeasor referred to even a sole
proprietor's business as "one of the worst in town," therefore, the suggested standard would
recognize that the statement is not necessarily equivalent to an attack upon the taxpayer
himself, and taxation would result accordingly.




Although the language of section 104(a)(2) might suggest that
taxing defamation damages is a clear-cut issue, problems arise
when the taxpayer suffers injury to his reputation in the form of
lost earnings or foregone economic opportunity. The Ninth Circuit
has adopted an approach that greatly reduces the potential for fed-
eral tax consequences to turn on tax-motivated tort complaint
drafting. In determining whether an injury is personal, the court
looked to the nature of the tort for which the taxpayer recovered
rather than to the effects of the injury. This approach, however, is
inefficient because it requires a potentially extensive analysis of
state law-a laborious task for a federal court trying a federal tax
issue. The Ninth Circuit's approach also is likely to result in the
uneven application of federal tax laws to taxpayers in different
states. Courts, therefore, should proceed beyond the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Roemer decision and apply a uniform standard to determine
whether an injury was personal and, therefore, exempt from taxa-
tion. Adopting this standard would discourage plaintiffs from
drafting tax-motivated tort complaints and would avoid Roemer's
inconsistency and inefficiency. Thus, the recommended approach
would enable courts to fulfill the objective of section 104(a)(2): to
exempt all personal injury awards from federal income taxation.
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